Differential privacy for growing databases by Kim, Gi Heung (Robin)
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Honors Theses Student Research
2017
Differential privacy for growing databases
Gi Heung (Robin) Kim
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Mathematics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kim, Gi Heung (Robin), "Differential privacy for growing databases" (2017). Honors Theses. 995.
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses/995
Differential Privacy for Growing Databases
Gi Heung (Robin) Kim
Honors Thesis∗
Department of Mathematics & Computer Science
University of Richmond
April 28, 2017
∗Under the direction of Dr. Sara Krehbiel
The signatures below, by the thesis advisor, the departmental reader, and the honors coordi-
nator for computer science, certify that this thesis, prepared by Robin (Gi Heung) Kim, has been
approved, as to style and content.
(Dr. Sara Krehbiel, thesis advisor)
(Dr. Prateek Bhakta, departmental reader)
(Dr. Lewis Barnett, honors coordinator)
Abstract
Differential privacy [DMNS06] is a strong definition of database privacy that provides indi-
viduals in a database with the guarantee that any particular person’s information has very little
effect on the output of any analysis of the overall database. In order for this type of analysis
to be practical, it must simultaneously preserve privacy and utility, where utility refers to how
well the analysis describes the contents of the database.
An analyst may additionally wish to evaluate how a database’s composition changes over
time. Consider a company, for example, that accumulates data from a growing base of customers.
This company may want to analyze how its customer base evolves over time. Despite the
practical need to conduct private analysis on growing databases, relatively little is known about
differential privacy in this setting.
In this work, we seek to expand the scope of a differentially private mechanism called the
median mechanism [RR10]. The median mechanism’s strength lies in its ability to answer many
queries interactively, satisfying both privacy and utility constraints. We examine how these
privacy and utility guarantees change in a growing database setting. First, we analyze the
median mechanism when run multiple times independently as the database size increases. This
approach is called sequential composition, and we show how to adjust parameters so that the
privacy guarantee suffers logarithmically with the number of runs of the mechanism without
any loss of utility. Having established this as a benchmark, we propose a new algorithm called
the memory mechanism. In contrast to sequential composition, the memory approach preserves
the history of the mechanism’s responses to earlier queries as the size increases. We show that
the memory mechanism’s worst case performance matches that of the sequential composition,
and we conjecture that the utility guarantee can be improved with natural constraints on the
queries asked in each phase and on the distribution of the data. Proving such a conjecture to
establish the benefit of the memory mechanism is left for future work.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Differential Privacy
In June 2016, Apple announced that they had begun collecting certain user information in a manner
that guarantees users a particular type of privacy called differential privacy. In a world in which
companies must extract information from vast quantities of data to stay competitive, the field of
differential privacy offers powerful tools for conducting accurate analysis while still offering strong
privacy guarantees to individuals in a database.
This field seeks to design mechanisms that answer statistical queries about an input database,
each row of which corresponds to the private data of a single data subject. In this work, X denotes
the universe of entries in a database, D ∈ Xn denotes a database on n entries, and M : Xn → R
denotes a mechanism (algorithm) that operates on such a database and produces output in rangeR.1
A good mechanism should simultaneously provide guarantees of differential privacy and utility.
Utility refers to a mechanism’s ability to answer queries accurately, and differential privacy refers
to the property that no row in the database has too much effect on the distribution of output
produced by the mechanism. The preliminaries section provides formal notation and definitions.
Definition 1.1 (Utility, informally). For any , δ > 0, a mechanism M : Xn → R is (, δ)-useful
for query q : Xn → R if for any database D ∈ Xn, we have Pr[|M(D)− q(D)| > ] ≤ δ.
Definition 1.2 (Privacy, informally). For any α, τ > 0, a mechanism M : Xn → R is (α, τ)-
differentially private if for any databases D,D′ ∈ Xn differing on only one row and any event
S ⊆ R, we have Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ eα · Pr[M(D′) ∈ S] + τ .
Note that both guarantees are parametrized, and smaller , α correspond to stronger utility and
privacy guarantees. We think of δ and τ as being the probabilities that the -utility and α-privacy
guarantees, respectively, are not met.
1For the informal definitions, we let R = R, indicating that a mechanism outputs a single real value.
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1.2 Independent Laplace Perturbation and the Exponential Mechanism
Output perturbation is the technique of adding random noise to the true answer for some database
query to establish a guarantee of differential privacy. More noise creates a stronger privacy guar-
antee at the cost of reduced utility. This tradeoff between privacy and utility is a central focus
of differentially private mechanism design. The simplest differentially private mechanism based on
output perturbation is called the Laplace mechanism, which adds Laplace noise to the output of a
predicate query on the input database. A predicate query q : Xn → [0, 1] calculates the proportion
of rows in a database satisfying some boolean predicate over X. Note that a single row change in
the database changes the answer to a predicate query by at most 1/n. The Laplace mechanism
draws this perturbation from Lap( 1nα), defined by probability density p(x) =
nα
2 exp(−nα|x|). This
mechanism provides (α, 0)-differential privacy and (, nα exp(−nα))-utility for any desired  > 0,
which is the best possible tradeoff between privacy and utility for pure (τ = 0) differentially privacy
mechanisms [GRS09].
However, if we wish to answer multiple queries on the same database using independent Laplace
perturbation, the parameter of the noise added to each query must scale linearly with the number
of queries to maintain privacy. This means only O(n) queries can be answered with meaningful
privacy and utility [RR10]. To avoid this downside of independent output perturbations, [BLR08]
showed how to use the exponential mechanism [MT07] to allow α to scale only logarithmically
with the number of queries with fixed α and . This approach guarantees both privacy and utility
over k queries, where k may be exponential in n. However, it also has two drawbacks. First,
the exponential mechanism requires all queries to be given upfront, not supporting interactive
analysis, which independent Laplace perturbation can handle. Second, the exponential mechanism
is inefficient since its running time is not polynomial in n, k and |X|.
1.3 The Median Mechanism
To circumvent these drawbacks, Roth and Roughgarden [RR10] developed a new mechanism called
the median mechanism. Compared to the Laplace mechanism whose privacy parameter α scales
linearly with the number of queries k, the median mechanism allows α to scale only logarithmically
2
with the number of queries k and the size of X, like the exponential mechanism. Moreover, the
median mechanism also avoids the drawbacks of the exponential mechanism, allowing an analyst
to supply queries interactively and admitting an efficient implementation.2
At its core, the median mechanism works by categorizing each incoming query in real-time
as either easy or hard. At a high level, the categorization works as follows. If the approximate
answer to a query can be derived from the answers to all previous queries, then the query is deemed
easy and the mechanism simply reports this fact to the analyst revealing no additional information
about the database. Otherwise, the query is deemed hard and the mechanism applies independent
Laplace perturbation. [RR10] proves that there can be only O(log k log|X|) hard queries. By only
perturbing a small fraction of the total queries, the median mechanism allows α to scale only
logarithmically with the number of queries answered. The details are covered in Section 3.
1.4 Our Results
This paper aims to broaden the scope of [RR10]. As with the vast majority of differentially
private mechanisms, the median mechanism works on a fixed database of size n. In this paper
we are considering a dynamic setting of a database where the content is constantly changing and
accumulating. We consider a simple model in which a database grows by n entries in each of
K phases. An analyst requests answers to k queries in each phase, and it is possible that the
content of new entries in a particular phase is completely different from the initial database. Our
contributions fall into three categories:
1. We first analyze sequential composition of the median mechanism. We show that we can
run the median mechanism independently K times, decreasing the privacy parameter in each
phase to maintain utility at a cost of only a logK factor in privacy. See Theorem 4.1 for the
formal statement of this result.
2. Next we propose a new mechanism called the memory mechanism, which retains the infor-
mation provided to the analyst across phases. We analyze this mechanism and show that it
2This work actually focuses on the less efficient implementation of the median mechanism described in [RR10],
but we expect our results to extend to their efficient implementation.
3
achieves the same performance as sequential composition of the median mechanism.
3. Finally, we conjecture that under natural assumptions about the distribution of new data
entries across phases and the queries requested in each phase, the memory mechanism can
provide stronger guarantees in later phases than sequential composition.
In Section 2, we formalize the notion of differential privacy and other background information
necessary for the rest of the paper. In Section 3, we restate the median mechanism from [RR10] and
reproduce their theorems and proofs. In Section 4 we formalize the sequential composition of the
median mechanism and show that the privacy parameter decreases with each additional phase. In
Section 5, we propose the memory mechanism, show that its performance matches that of sequential
composition of the median mechanism, and we conjecture that the memory mechanism can provide
a stronger utility guarantee. Finally in Section 6, we discuss future work to be done of the paper.
2 Preliminaries
This section presents the formal notation and definitions used throughout. We use R to denote
the reals, Z to denote the integers, and Z+ to denote the positive integers. For n ∈ Z+ we write
the nth harmonic number as Hn =
∑
i∈[n] 1/i. For any set X and n ∈ Z+, Xn denotes the set of
n-tuples of elements in X.
In our database setting, sach of n data subjects has information described as an element in
data universe X. The data for each subject is stored as a row in database D ∈ Xn. We consider
mechanisms that operate on a database D ∈ Xn and answer a sequence of k ∈ Z+ queries f =
(f1, . . . , fk). We let M(D, f) denote the random variable describing the distribution of outputs on
the specified inputs. Differential privacy bounds how much this random variable can change due
to a change in a single row of the database. Databases D and D′ are said to be neighboring if they
differ on a single row, and in this case we write D ∼ D′. Using this notation, we can now state
formal definitions of (, δ)-usefulness and (α, τ)-privacy:
Definition 2.1. For α, τ > 0, a mechanism M : Xn → Rk that responds to k queries is (α, τ)-
differentially private if for any pair of neighboring databases D,D′ ∈ Xn, any sequence of queries
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f1, . . . , fk : X
n → R, and any subset S ⊆ Rk:
Pr[M(D, f1, . . . , fk) ∈ S] ≤ eα · Pr[M(D′, f1, . . . , fk) ∈ S] + τ.
Definition 2.2. For , δ > 0, a mechanism M : Xn → Rk that responds to k queries is (, δ)-useful
if for any database D ∈ Xn and any sequence of queries f1, . . . , fk : Xn → R, it provides answers
a1, . . . , ak such that with all but probability at most δ each answer is -accurate, i.e.,
Pr[∀ i ∈ [k], |fi(D)− ai| ≤ ] ≥ 1− δ
We strive for δ to be inverse polynomial in k and n so that the mechanism outputs answers
within  of the true answer with high probability. We strive for τ to be negligible in k and n so
that changing a single element of the input database impacts the probability of any outcome by at
most a small factor eα with overwhelming probability.
For any real-valued query q : Xn → R and any desired α > 0, [DMNS06] show how to construct
a mechanism that is (α, 0)-differentially private (often simply called α-differentially private) by
computing q(D) and adding Laplace noise that is calibrated to the sensitivity of the query. The
sensitivity of any real-valued query q is the maximum amount it can change due to a single row
change, denoted ∆(q) = maxD∼D′ |q(D)− q(D′)|. The definition of the Laplace distribution and
description of how to calibrate noise to sensitivity are as follows:
Definition 2.3. For any b > 0, let Lap(b) denote the Laplace distribution, with probability density
p(x) = 12b exp(−|x|/b) for any x ∈ R.
Theorem 2.4. For any real-valued query q : Xn → R and any α > 0, the Laplace mechanism
M(D) = q(D) + Lap(∆(q)/α) is α-differentially private.
A mechanism can reply to multiple queries via independent output perturbation, also called
sequential composition, but the privacy parameter suffers linearly with the number of queries
answered. It is not hard to show the following more general result:
Lemma 2.5 (Composition lemma). Let αi, τi > 0 for i ∈ [k], and let Mi : Xn → R be a (αi, τi-
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differentially private for each i ∈ [k]. Then the mechanism M(D) = (M1(D), . . . ,Mk(D)) concate-
nating the outputs of each Mi is (
∑
i∈[k] αi,
∑
i∈[k] τi)-differentially private.
Finally we note that this work is primarily concerned with mechanisms for approximating
predicate queries on databases. A predicate over X maps each element in X to a bit. For predicate
f : X → {0, 1}, we also use f to denote the corresponding predicate query over a database,
evaluated as f(D) = |{x∈D:f(X)=1}||D| , which computes the fraction of elements of the database D
that satisfies predicate f . Note that predicate queries have sensitivity 1/n for databases of size n.
3 The Median Mechanism
3.1 Mechanism
The median mechanism [RR10] is parametrized by privacy and utility parameters α,  > 0, data
universe X, and query budget k ∈ Z+. It takes as input a database D ∈ Xn and first initializes a set
C of all databases of size m = Θ(
log k log 1

2
). Throughout the life of the mechanism, C represents the
set of all databases consistent with D based only on the information that the mechanism provides
to the analyst.
Queries f1, . . . , fk arrive online. The mechanism categorizes each query fi as either easy (di = 0)
or hard (di = 1) based on how well the query answer on the true database coheres with C. To do
this while respecting privacy, the mechanism compares a noisy version of the query’s easiness ri
(a measure of similarity between fi(D) and fi(S) for each S ∈ C) to a noisy threshold ti. The
mechanism replies to hard queries via output perturbation and further removes from C all databases
far away from the noisy reply. The mechanism replies to easy queries with the median value of the
query on databases in C.
Note that after receiving a noisy answer to a hard query, the analyst knows exactly how the
mechanism updates C, and so upon learning that a query is easy, the analyst already knows the
query’s median value on C. This observation is important in the privacy analysis of the mechanism,
and it is the central reason the mechanism is able to answer exponentially many queries interactively
while maintaining meaningful privacy and utility.
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Algorithm 1 The median mechanism for privacy and utility parameters α,  > 0, data universe X,
and query budget k ∈ Z+
• Upon initialization with database D ∈ Xn:
Let m =
160000 ln k ln 1

2
.
Let α′ = α720m ln|X| .
Let γ = 4α′n ln
2k
α .
Let C be the set of all databases of size m.
Let i, h = 0.
• Upon receipt of a new query with i < k and h < 20m log|X|:
Increment i and let fi be the new query.
Let ri =
∑
S∈C exp(−|fi(D)−fi(S)|/)
|C| and rˆi = ri + Lap(
2
nα′ ).
Let ti =
3
4 + ξ · γ for ξ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 320γ } chosen with probability proportional to 2−ξ.
If rˆi ≥ ti,
Let di = 0 (easy).
Let ai = median{fi(S) : S ∈ C}.
Otherwise,
Let di = 1 (hard) and increment h.
Let ai = fi(D) + Lap(
1
nα′ ).
Remove from C all S ∈ C with |fi(S)− ai| > /50.
Output (di, ai).
In this section, we provide a more detailed proof of the below theorem for the median mechanism
from [RR10], which serves as the starting point for the analysis of sequential composition of the
median mechanism and the memory mechanism described in the following sections.
Theorem 3.1. There exist constants cτ , cδ, cn > 0 such that for any privacy and utility parame-
ters α,  > 0, data universe X, and query budget k ∈ Z+, the median mechanism satisfies (α, τ)-
differential privacy and (, δ)-utility for τ = exp(− cτ ln k ln
1

ln|X|
2
) and δ = k exp(− cδnα3
ln k ln 1

ln|X|) when
run on databases of size n ≥ cn ln
2k
α
ln2 k ln 1

ln|X|
α3
.
Note that for n as above, τ and δ are negligible and inverse polynomial, respectively, in k and
n. We separately prove the privacy and utility guarantees in the following two subsections. All of
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the following lemmas are with respect to arbitrary parameters α,  > 0, X, and k ∈ Z+, arbitrary
input data D ∈ Xn for sufficiently large n, and arbitrary predicate queries f1, . . . , fk. The values
of m,α′, γ used in the proofs are as initialized by the mechanism.
3.2 Utility Analysis
To establish utility, [RR10] shows that with all but probability δ = k exp(−cδnα′) for sufficiently
small constant cδ, sufficient conditions hold to ensure that every query is answered with -accuracy
and the mechanism does not exceed the hard query budget h = 20m log|X|. Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3
respectively show that with high probability, not too much noise is added to any query’s easiness
measure and not too much noise is added to any hard query answer. Lemma 3.4 shows that
accurate easiness measures guarantee -accuracy for easy queries. Finally Lemma 3.6 uses a uniform
convergence bound to show that if easiness measures are accurate, then the mechanism will not
categorize more than the maximum allowed number of queries as hard.
Lemma 3.2. With probability at least 1− δ2 , |ri − rˆi| ≤ 1100 for every query i.
Proof. Recall rˆi = ri + Lap(
2
nα′ ). Then by definition of the Laplace distribution, we have
Pr[|rˆi − ri| > 1/100] = Pr[|Lap(2/(nα′))| > 1/100] = exp(− 1
100
· nα
′
2
).
By union bound over every query i ∈ [k], this event occurs for any query with ≤ δ/2 probability.
Lemma 3.3. With probability at least 1− δ2 , the answer to every hard query is ( 100)-accurate.
Proof. Recall that an answer to a hard query i is calculated as ai = fi(D)+Lap(
1
nα′ ), and a query
answer is ( 100)-accurate if |fi(D)− ai| ≤ 100 by Definition 2.2. Then we have
Pr[|fi(D)− ai| > /100] = Pr[|Lap(1/(nα′))| > /100] = exp(− 
100
· nα′).
There are at most k hard queries, so union bound again gives us our desired result.
Lemma 3.4. If |ri − rˆi| ≤ 1100 for every query i, then every answer to an easy query is -accurate.
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Proof. Let C be the current set of hypothetical databases stored by the mechanism when it is about
to answer some easy query fi, and let G = {S ∈ C : |fi(D)− fi(S)| ≤ } denote the subset of good
databases in C that align with the real answer fi(D) within at most  error. If |G| ≥ .51|C|, the
median value of fi on C is -accurate. It is therefore enough to prove that if |ri − rˆi| ≤ 1/100 and
i is categorized as easy, then |G| ≥ .51|C|.
Noting that ti ≥ 3/4, and i is categorized easy if and only if rˆi ≥ ti, easiness implies ri ≥ 74/100
assuming |rˆi − ri| ≤ 1/100. It is therefore enough to show that |G| < .51|C| implies ri < 74/100.
ri =
∑
S∈G exp(−|fi(D)− fi(S)|/) +
∑
S∈C\G exp(−|fi(D)− fi(S)|/)
|C|
=
|G|+ |C\G|/e
|C|
=
|G|(1− 1/e) + |C|/e
|C|
<
.51|C|(1− 1/e) + |C|/e
|C|
= .51(1− 1/e) + 1/e
< 74/100
Finally, we must show that the mechanism is not likely to abort by classifying too many
queries as hard. Lemma 3.6 does this by showing that the set of hypothetical databases C shrinks
substantially after every hard query, assuming the conclusion of Lemma 3.2. The following uniform
convergence bound determines an appropriate value of m to ensure that one of the hypothetical
databases simulates D for all k queries, guaranteeing that C contains at least one database that
will survive all phases of contraction.
Proposition 3.5. (Uniform Convergence Bound). For every collection of k predicate queries
fi, . . . , fk and every database D, a database S obtained by sampling points from D uniformly at
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random will satisfy |fi(D)− fi(S)| ≤  for all i except with probability δ, provided
|S| ≥ 1
22
(log k + log
2
δ
).
In particular, some database S of size m =
160000 ln k ln 1

2
satisfies |fi(D)− fi(S)| ≤ 400 for all i ∈ [k].
Lemma 3.6. If |rˆi − ri| ≤ 1100 for every query i and every answer to a hard query is ( 100)-accurate,
then the median mechanism classifies fewer than 20m log|X| queries as hard.
Proof. We track how C contracts as we answer hard queries. For any hard query i, we have:
By assumption︷ ︸︸ ︷
ri ≤ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
i is hard so rˆi < ti
rˆi +
1
100
ξ≤ 3
20γ
so ti=
3
4
+ξγ≤ 90
100︷ ︸︸ ︷
< ti +
1
100
≤ 91
100
At least 6% of the databases S ∈ C have |fi(S)− ai| > /50, because otherwise:
ri =
∑
S∈C exp(−|fi(D)− fi(S)|/)
|C| >
94
100
e−
1
50 >
92
100
Let h be the number queries classified as hard out of the k total queries. Then noting that initially
|C| = |X|m, the size of C after all k queries can be bounded as:
|C| ≤ ( 94
100
)h|X|m
The uniform convergence bound says that some database in C must survive all hard queries, so:
h ≤ 1
ln(10094 )
m ln|X| < 20m ln|X|
3.3 Privacy Analysis
This section reproduces the proofs from [RR10] to show that the median mechanism is (α, τ)-
differentially private. The median mechanism essentially outputs two values: a vector query answers
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a ∈ Rk and a vector d ∈ {0, 1}k indicating whether each query fi was classified as easy (di = 0)
or hard (di = 1). Since an analyst can compute easy answers herself and Laplace perturbation is
added to hard answers, the privacy of a is straightforward. This section focuses on arguing that the
noise encapsulated in d suffices for privacy without causing the mechanism’s behavior to diverge
much on neighboring inputs with more than probability τ .
In Lemma 3.7, we first reproduce the proof that the easiness measure ri has small sensitivity,
which informs how much noise should be added to ri for privacy. Along with the correct calibration
of noise added to hard query answers, this ensures that (di, ai) for any particular query suffers
privacy cost 2α′. However, this is not enough for our desired privacy guarantee for the overall
mechanism, which must answer k queries, many of them easy. In Lemma 3.8, we show that with
overwhelming probability, the thresholds ti generated by the mechanism are good in that most
queries are classified as very easy, which in turn allows [RR10] to bound the probability differences
between the behavior of the mechanism on neighboring databases as required in Lemma 3.9.
Lemma 3.7. For every fixed set C of databases and predicate query f , the easiness function
ri(D) =
∑
S∈C exp(−|f(D)−f(S)|/)
|C| has sensitivity ∆(ri) =
2
n .
Proof. Noting that the sensitivity of any predicate query is n, for any predicate query f , set C of
databases, and neighboring databases D and D′ of size n ∈ N, we have:
ri(D) =
∑
S∈C exp(− |f(D)−f(S)| )
|C|
≤
∑
S∈C exp(−
|f(D′)−f(S)|− 1
n
 )
|C|
= exp(
1
n
) · ri(D′)
≤ (1 + 2
n
) · ri(D′)
≤ ri(D′) + 2
n
,
where the second to last inequality holds as long as n ≥ 1/, which is implied by the bound on n
in Theorem 3.1.
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The next lemma demonstrates that with all but probability τ = exp(−cτm ln|X|) for sufficiently
small constant cτ > 0, all but 180m ln|X| of the thresholds ti generated randomly by the mechanism
are good. A threshold ti is good for query i if the query was categorized as easy (di = 0) and its
noiseless easiness value ri exceeds ti by at least γ.
di = 0 di = 1
ri ≥ ti + γ ti is good ti is bad
ri < ti + γ ti is bad ti is bad
Lemma 3.8. For every database D, with all but τ probability, the thresholds t generated by the
median mechanism are good for its output (d, a).
Proof. Lemma 3.6 shows that there are at most 20m ln|X| queries i with di = 1. It suffices to
show that at most 160m ln|X| queries i have ri < ti + γ. Let Yi be a random variable indicating
ri < ti + γ, and let Y =
∑
i∈[k] Yi. We first show that queries i with ri ≥ 9/10 contribute at most
m ln|X| to Y , and then we show that queries i with ri < 9/10 contribute at most 159m ln|X|.
Suppose ri ≥ 9/10. Then Yi = 1 only if ti = 9/10. Since ti = 34 +γ · ξ with ξ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 1γ · 320},
the only way to have ti = 9/10 is if ξ =
1
γ · 320 , which occurs with probability proportional to 2−3/(20γ).
With γ = 4α′n ln
2k
α and n ≥
30 ln 2k
α
log k
α′ , as implied by the bound in Theorem 3.1, this event occurs
with probability ≤ 1/k. Therefore such queries contribute at most 1 to Y in expectation. Since the
ti are chosen independently at random for each i, the Chernoff bound implies that the probability
that there are more than m ln|X| such queries is at most τ/2.
Now suppose ri < 9/10. Let T be the set of all possible thresholds ti such that ri < ti + γ.
Let si be the smallest threshold in T . Note that |T | > 1. By choosing ξ proportional to 2−ξ, we
guarantee that Pr[ti ∈ Ti] ≤ 2 Pr[ti ∈ Ti\{si}] + c/k for some constant c. Note that for every
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threshold ti ∈ T\{si}, ti > ri. Together, these observations give us:
Pr[ti > rˆi] ≥ Pr[ti > ri] · Pr[Lap( 2
nα′
) ≤ 0]
= Pr[ti ∈ Ti\{si}] · 1
2
≥ 1
4
(Pr[ti ∈ Ti]− c/k)
=
1
4
Pr[ri < ti + γ]− c/(4k)
The mechanism ensures that the total number of i with ti > rˆi is at most 20m ln|X|. Then with
linearity of expectation, the Chernoff bound implies that queries with ri ≤ 9/10 contribute at most
159m ln|X| to Y except with probability τ/2.
Let MM(D, f) denote either the distribution of outputs (d, a) or the distribution of outputs
(t, d, a) for internally chosen thresholds t, we observe that by the previous lemma, we have
Pr[MM(D, f) ∈ S] ≤ τ +
∑
(d,a)∈S
∑
t good
for (d,a)
Pr[MM(D, f) = (t, d, a)]
The following lemma therefore suffices for privacy.
Lemma 3.9. For any neighboring databases D and D′, queries f = (f1, . . . , fk), outputs (d, a), and
corresponding good thresholds t, we have Pr[MM(D, f) = (t, d, a)] ≤ eα Pr[MM(D′, f) = (t, d, a)].
Proof. For any query i, let Ei denote the event that MM(D, f) matches the target output (d, a)
on the first i queries. Let E ′i denote the analogous event for MM(D′, f). Let bi indicate that
MM(D, f) classifies query i as hard, and let b′i indicate that MM(D
′, f) classifies query i as hard.
Both bi and b
′
i depend on C, so we condition on the events Ei−1 and E ′i−1 respectively to
ensure that the mechanisms running on D and D′ have the same C when processing query i. The
randomness of the threshold is independent of the state of the mechanism, and since the mechanism
adds Lap( 2α′n) noise to ri, which by Lemma 3.7 has sensitivity
2
n , the single-query categorization
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process is α′-differentially private in the following sense:
Pr[bi = 0 | Ei−1] ≤ eα′ · Pr[b′i = 0 | E ′i−1] (3.1)
Pr[bi = 1 | Ei−1] ≤ eα′ · Pr[b′i = 1 | E ′i−1]. (3.2)
To evaluate the respective probabilities of a particular ai for the mechanism running on neigh-
boring databases, we first consider the case that the target classification of i is hard (di = 1), and
then we consider the case that the target classification of i is easy (di = 0).
Suppose di = 1 and let si and s
′
i denote the mechanism’s noisy answer to query i when running
on D and D′, respectively. Agreeing with the target output on query i requires agreeing with both
the target classification and the target answer, which are subject to independent perturbations, so:
Pr[Ei | Ei−1] = Pr[bi = 1 | Ei−1] · Pr[si = ai | Ei−1]
Pr[E ′i | E ′i−1] = Pr[b′i = 1 | E ′i−1] · Pr[s′i = ai | E ′i−1]
Then by Equation 3.2 and the noise added to easiness computations and hard query answers:
P [Ei | Ei−1] = e2α′P [E ′i | E ′i−1] (3.3)
Now suppose di = 0 and let mi the median value of fi on C conditioning on Ei or E ′i. Then we
have the following possibilities:
Pr[Ei | Ei−1] =

0 if mi 6= ai
Pr[bi = 0 | Ei−1] if mi = ai
and similarly for Pr[E ′i | E ′i−1]. As before, we can argue that Pr[Ei | Ei−1] ≤ eα
′
Pr[E ′i | E ′i−1], but
paying this cost for all the easy queries will quickly exceed our privacy budget.
Note that since we only have to compare target outputs for possible runs of the mechanism,
assuming events Ei−1, E ′i−1 and di = d′i = 0, it is safe to also assume that mi = m′i = ai, so it suffices
to bound Pr[Ei | Ei−1] ≤ 1 with respect to Pr[E ′i | E ′i−1] = Pr[b′i = 0 | E ′i−1]. Let ri and r′i denote the
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true easiness of query i for MM(D, f) and MM(D′, f) given Ei−1 and E ′i−1, respectively. Suppose
additionally that ri ≤ ti+γ, which is true for all but 180m ln|X| thresholds by the assumption that
t is good for (d, a). By the sensitivity of ri, we also have r
′
i ≥ ti + γ − 2n ≥ ti + γ/2. This means
that i is classified easy by MM(D′, f) whenever MM adds > −γ/2 noise to r′i:
Pr[b′i = 0 | E ′i−1] ≥ Pr[r′i − rˆ′i < γ/2]
= Pr[Lap(
2
nα′
) > −γ/2]
= 1− 1
2
e−γnα
′/4
= 1− α
4k
Rearranging this, noting that Pr[Ei | Ei−1] ≤ 1:
Pr[Ei | Ei−1] ≤ (1− α
4k
)−1 Pr[E ′i | E ′i−1]. (3.4)
Applying Equation 3.3 to at most 180m ln|X| bad queries and Equation 3.4 to all other queries,
we complete the proof as follows:
Pr[MM(D, f) = (t, d, a)] =
k∏
i=1
P [Ei | Ei−1]
≤ e360α′m ln|X| · (1− α
4k
)−k ·
k∏
i=1
Pr[E ′i | E ′i−1]
≤ eα · Pr[MM(D′, f) = (t, d, a)]
4 The Median Mechanism for a Growing Database
Although the median mechanism allows an analyst to submit queries interactively, it assumes that
the database is fixed. We now show how to run the mechanism multiple times so that an analyst
may ask queries as the database grows, and we give privacy and utility results for this setting.
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4.1 Mechanism
We consider K ∈ Z+ phases of database growth, where each phase involves n entries being added
to the database. For every growth phase j ∈ [K], we initialize a new run of the median mechanism
on the larger database for up to k queries with a fixed utility parameter but a decreasing privacy
parameter.
Algorithm 2 Sequential composition of the median mechanism for privacy and utility parameters
α,  > 0, data universe X, query budget k ∈ Z+, cK > 1, and number of phases K ∈ Z+
• Upon initialization with a database size n ∈ Z+:
Let D be a database of size 0 over X.
Let j = 0.
• Upon receipt of ≥ n new data entries in X with j < K:
Increment j and let D be the concatenation of itself with the new data.
Initialize the median mechanism with parameters cKα/j, ,X, k and input database D.
Forward up to k queries to the current instantiation of the median mechanism.
The following subsection sketches a generalization of the argument that if we use privacy pa-
rameter cKα/j for phase j ∈ [K], we lose only a logK factor in the privacy parameter, as long as
K ≤ cK(2k/α)cK−1. The following theorem states this result formally:
Theorem 4.1. There exist constants cτ , cδ, cn > 0 such that for any privacy and utility pa-
rameters α,  > 0, data universe X, query budget k ∈ Z+, cK > 1, and number of phases
K ≤ cK(2kα )cK−1, sequential composition of the median mechanism as described above satis-
fies (cKHKα,Kτ)-differential privacy and (,Kδ)-utility for τ = exp(− cτ ln k ln
1

ln|X|
2
) and δ =
k exp(− cδnα3
ln k ln 1

ln|X|) when initialized with database size n ≥
cn ln
2k
α
ln2 k ln 1

ln|X|
α3
.
4.2 Utility and Privacy Analysis
For fixed α,  > 0, X, k ∈ Z+cK > 1,K ≤ cK(2k/α)cK−1, and for constant cn as in the above
theorem, let C =
cn ln
2 k ln 1

ln|X|
3
. It is enough to show that n ≥ C ln
2k
α
α as required for a single phase
of the median mechanism implies jn ≥ C ln
2k
cKα/j
cKα/j
for j ≤ cK(2kα )cK−1, allowing us apply the median
mechanism results for phase j with privacy parameter cK
α
j . Then the composition theorem will
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give (cKHKα,Kτ)-privacy, and the results from the median mechanism’s utility proof will compose
with no change in  and δ suffering linearly with K by union bound. We apply the bounds on n
and j as follows to get this result:
jn ≥ jC ln
2k
α
α
≥ C ln(
2k
α )
cK
cKα/j
≥ C
ln 2kcKα/j
cKα/j
5 The Memory Mechanism
5.1 Mechanism
The memory mechanism seeks to preserve the information about previous phases that repeated
independent application of the median mechanism ignores. For simplicity, first consider this two-
phased scenario. Our mechanism will start with an initial database D1 of size n and answers k
queries, consistent with the median mechanism. In phase 2, we append another database D2 of
size n to the original database D1 and answer another set of k queries. In order to answer the
phase 2 queries, we replace the set of hypothetical databases at the end of phase 1 with its cross
product with a new set of all databases of size m at the beginning of phase 2, and then we proceed
to answer the phase 2 queries using this larger space of hypothetical databases. We present this
idea generalized to K-phased scenario, reducing our privacy parameter as the database increases
size as we did when analyzing sequential composition of the median mechanism.
The size of the databases in C increases by m for each phase, but the number of new data
entries each phase needn’t be the same as long as each phase it is at least nmin. Comparing f(D)
to the result of the query run on database S ∈ C, we must appropriately weight the blocks of m
rows in S. For predicate query f and a set C of databases of size jm for some j ∈ [K], define:
fC(S) =
∑
`∈[j]
|D`|
|D| f(S`) where S` represents the `th block of m rows of S.
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Algorithm 3 The memory mechanism for privacy and utility parameters α,  > 0, data universe X,
query budget k ∈ Z+, and number of phases K ∈ Z+
• Upon initialization:
Let m =
160000 ln(Kk) ln 1

2
Let nmin =
21600m ln 2k
α
log2 k ln|X|
α
Let D be a database of size 0 over X.
Let C be a set of databases containing a single database of size 0 over X.
Let j, i, h = 0.
• Upon receipt of ≥ nmin new data entries with j < K:
Increment j.
Replace D with its concatenation with the new data Dj .
Replace C with its cross product with the set of all databases of size m.
Let α′j =
α
720jm ln|X| .
Let γj =
4
α′j|D| ln
2k
α/j .
Let imax = i+ k, hmax = 20jm log|X|.
• Upon receipt of a new query with i < imax and h < hmax:
Increment i and let fi be the new query.
Let ri =
∑
S∈C exp(−|fi(D)−fCi (S)|/)
|C| and rˆi = ri + Lap(
2
|D|α′j ).
Let ti =
3
4 + ξ · γj for ξ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 320γj } chosen with probability proportional to 2−ξ.
If rˆi ≥ ti,
Let ai = median{fCi (S) : S ∈ C}.
Otherwise,
Let ai = fi(D) + Lap(
1
|D|α′j ).
Remove from C all S ∈ C with |fCi (S)− ai| > /50 and increment h.
Output ai.
Our privacy and utility results for the memory mechanism are summarized in Theorem 5.1.
We note that the mechanism may refuse to either accept a new set of data that contains too few
entries or process queries beyond the per-phase total query budget of k in a given phase. Avoiding
these events are the user’s responsibility, whereas reaching hmax before reaching imax is considered
a utility failure of the mechanism, because a user should be allowed to make k arbitrary queries and
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cannot know before the request whether a given query will be easy or hard. This is the purpose
of Lemma 5.3 in conjunction with the other lemmas in the utility section. An (,Kδ)-usefulness
guarantee therefore ensures that with all but probability Kδ, the mechanism will answer the first k
queries in each phase with -accuracy. Since the minimum size increase threshold and the number
of queries per phase is not affected by the data itself, no-ops caused by users failing to abide by
these restrictions impose no additional privacy cost, so the privacy guarantee has the exact same
meaning as in the single-phase median mechanism.
Theorem 5.1. There exist constants cτ , cδ > 0 such that for any privacy and utility parameters
α,  > 0, data universe X, query budget k ∈ Z+, and number of phases K ∈ Z+, the memory
mechanism satisfies (HKα,Kτ)-differential privacy and (, 2Kδ)-utility for τ = exp(− cτ ln k ln
1

ln|X|
2
)
and δ = k exp(− cδnα3
ln k ln 1

ln|X|).
5.2 Utility and Privacy Analysis
Our proof of usefulness follows that the proof structure in [RR10]. With high probability, not too
much noise is added to any query’s easiness ri and all hard queries are answered /100-accurately;
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 present and prove these results for the median mechanism. Here we present
the first of these results for the memory mechanism (Lemma 5.2) with proof to show how the
proof must be modified in the multi-phase setting; the second result can be proven analogously.
Lemma 3.4 for the median mechanism shows that the former event is enough to guarantee that
all easy queries are answered -accurately; its proof is independent of database size and privacy
parameters, so the analogous result for the memory mechanism is immediate. Finally we present
and prove that with high probability the memory mechanism does not classify too many queries
as hard in any of the K phases (Lemma 5.3, analogous to Lemma 3.6 for the median mechanism).
Together, these results give our (,Kδ)-usefulness result.
Lemma 5.2. With all but < Kδ probability, |rˆi − ri| ≤ 1/100 for every query i.
Proof. For any query i in phase j ∈ [K], we add Lap( 2
|D|α′j ) noise to ri. Noting that the parameter
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can be bounded by 2
|D|α′j ≤
1
15 ln 2k
α
log2 k
, we have:
Pr[|rˆi − ri| ≤ 1/100] ≤ 2 · Pr[Lap( 1
15 ln 2kα log2 k
) ≤ −1/100]
= exp(−15 ln 2k
α
log2 k/100)
≤ 1
kcδ ln
2k
α
= δ/k.
Then by union bound over the maximum number of queries Kk, we get our desired result.
Lemma 5.3. If |rˆi − ri| ≤ 1/100 for every query i and |ai − fi(D)| ≤ /100 for every hard query
i, then h ≤ 20jm log|X| at the end of any phase j ∈ [K].
Proof. By the argument given in RR, |C| decreases by at least 6% after each hard query and
increases by a multiplicative factor |X|m at the beginning of each new phase. Hence if hj denotes
h at the end of phase j ∈ [K] and if cj denotes |C| at the end of phase j ∈ [K], we have
cj ≤
(
94
100
)hj
|X|jm
Applying the uniform convergence bound given in RR, we know there exists a database S∗j ∈ Xm
for each j ∈ [K] such that |fi(Dj)− fi(S∗j )| ≤ /100 for each hard query i in phases j, . . . ,K. The
concatenation of these S∗j databases remains in C since for hard query i in phase j ∈ [K], we have:
|fCi (S∗1 || . . . ||S∗j )− ai| ≤ |fCi (S∗1 || . . . ||S∗j )− fi(D)|+ |fi(D)− ai|
≤ |
∑
`∈[j]
|D`|
|D| (fi(S
∗
` )− fi(D`))|+

100
≤ 
100
·
∑
`∈[j]
|D`|
|D| +

100
= /50.
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Thus c1, . . . , cK ≥ 1, so we conclude that for each j ∈ [K], we have
hj ≤ 1
ln 10094
jm ln|X| ≤ 20jm log|X|.
The privacy result for the memory mechanism follows with minimal modification to the privacy
analysis for the median mechanism. A direct analog of Lemma 3.8 for the median mechanism
establishes with all but Kτ probability, the memory mechanism generates good thresholds. An
analog of Lemma 3.9 updated to reflect the differing values of α′ in each phase shows that the
difference in probability of any particular output for neighboring databases is bounded conditioning
on the event that the mechanism generates good thresholds. As with the median mechanism, these
two results are enough to give the desired privacy guarantee.
5.3 Conjectured Utility Improvements
We remark that Theorem 5.1 for the memory mechanism does not illustrate an asymptotic im-
provement over the results for sequential composition of the median mechanism, and it seems likely
that these results are tight in the worst case. However, the state of the memory mechanism cap-
tures strictly more information than that of the median mechanism. We therefore conjecture that
for some notion of a typical use case of the memory mechanism, it is possible to improve on the
utility guarantees with no further privacy cost. Here we briefly describe two classes of assumptions
we might reasonably make about typical use cases that would allow us to answer more queries in
subsequent phases with greater accuracy.
For many realistic settings, it may be fair to assume that the database composition does not
change too much across phases. Of course if the exact same entries are received in each phase, the
data after the first phase are useless. However, if any constant number of predicate queries are
allowed to have arbitrarily different answers across phases, we can assume that all but a negligible
fraction of the 2|X| total possible predicate queries are meaningfully affected. For super-constant k,
this means that a vanishing fraction of queries asked in a particular phase will have an answer
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significantly different from the answer that would have been provided in an earlier phase.
We may combine with this assumption the assumption that the analyst does not ask too many
new queries in each phase. On one hand, a core function of our mechanism is to support analysis
that is interactive not only in response to new information from fixed data but also in response to
information learned from new data. On the other hand, an analyst’s primary questions of interest
will not necessarily change much, even as the answers to these questions evolve with new data. If
we allow an analyst to ask only a constant number of new queries each phase, the prior assumption
that the new data only affects answers for a constant number of new queries ensures that only a
constant fraction of queries each phase will be hard.
We hope that these two assumptions together may allow us to provide refined utility analysis
for later phases when more is known about the data. If this refined analysis is not possible for the
memory mechanism as is, the assumptions may provide guidance for how to modify the memory
mechanism to answer queries in a way that makes more careful use of the statefulness of the
mechanism and in turn yields better utility.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the inner workings of the median mechanism by deconstructing the
proofs in [RR10] and establishing a baseline for the future work, motivated by the need for a
mechanism that can accommodate a dynamically growing database. To establish that it is possible
to handle this setting, we analyzed the privacy and utility of both sequential composition of the
median mechanism and our new memory mechanism.
We have shown that sequential composition gives a privacy guarantee that suffers only log-
arithmically in the number of phases of database growth. The worst case performance for the
memory mechanism matches that of sequential composition. In the future, we hope to formally
prove that under natural assumptions, keeping track of both the composition of smaller databases
from previous phases as well as the information the analyst has learned about them will allow for
improved utility in later phases.
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